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Abstract— The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) 
community has for many years recognized the potential benefits 
made by adapting mission planning on-the-fly. Over the years 
there has been some degree of success in applying adaptive 
mission planning to very specific problems. Examples of 
applications include capabilities for a vehicle to search for, and 
then modify its trajectory to follow, a feature such as a plume or 
a thermocline, or to modify its trajectory to avoid an obstacle, or 
to find and follow a feature such as a pipeline. Despite an evident 
increase in the number of applications, the use of adaptive 
mission planning is still in its infancy. There is no doubt that 
adaptive mission planning will play a pivotal role in future AUV 
persistent presence. So what is delaying this technology from 
making the leap towards wider industry acceptance? This paper 
reviews the literature in adaptive mission planning and uses a 
failure analysis technique to identify key obstacles for the 
integration of this technique in wider AUV applications. We use 
our failure analysis to help devise recommendations for 
mitigating these obstacles. The complexity of the mathematical 
approaches used by adaptive techniques is one key obstacle. 
Perhaps of more importance is that the AUV community is 
increasingly requiring quantitative assessment of risk associated 
with the use of AUVs. We propose that probability is the 
appropriate measure for quantifying the risk of adaptive systems 
and their uncertainty. The work here presented is a collective 
endeavor of the Engineering Committee on Oceanic Resources 
Specialist Panel on Underwater Vehicles. 
Index Terms—autonomous underwater vehicles, adaptive 
mission planning, risk, precision, positioning. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The research presented in this paper is a result of a 
collective endeavor of the Engineering Committee on Oceanic 
Resources (ECOR) Specialist Panel on Underwater Vehicles 
(SPUV) to understand the potential role of adaptive mission 
planning in persistent autonomous underwater presence. 
By now a number of nations share the vision that 
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) provide an 
increasingly capable solution for ocean sampling and 
surveillance systems [1][2]. As a result many commercial 
manufacturers are now able to supply the growing market. 
Curtin et al. [3], argue that a network of autonomous 
underwater vehicles is a low cost solution able to meet the 
following objectives: global deployment; sustained presence; 
three dimensional adaptive performance and real time control 
and robust performance.  
Indeed major advances in energy consumption and 
communications have led to the development of a new 
generation of AUVs that permit global deployment, sustained 
presence and real time control and robust performance. 
However the use of adaptive mission planning is not as widely 
adopted as originally envisaged. 
Researchers in the field of mission control of autonomous 
underwater vehicles have for many years recognized the 
potential gains to be made by adapting the mission plan of the 
vehicle on-the-fly. Examples of mission plan changes might be 
for a vehicle to search for and then modify its trajectory to 
follow a characteristic, such as an outfall plume or a 
thermocline [4]; it might be for a vehicle to have to modify its 
path to avoid an obstacle, or to search for, find and follow a 
feature, such as a buried pipeline; or it might be for an action to 
be taken by a vehicle when a particular value is registered on a 
sensor, such as the collection of a water sample if the 
concentration of a particular chemical reaches a certain value, 
or for fault tolerance [5][6].  
However, the use of adaptive mission planning systems is 
still in its infancy. As AUVs evolve to address more ambitious 
mission requirements the key question that needs to be 
addressed is, can we rely on adaptive mission technology for 
AUV mission planning on the fly?  
There are many potential causes for the failure to adopt a 
given technology. The objective of this paper is to identify the 
main reasons that may be impeding greater use of adaptive 
mission systems so that we can identify potential mitigation 
actions that can be used by AUV stakeholders, developers, 
industry, or marine science users. We have conducted a formal 
investigation into the reasons causing failure to adopt mission 
adaptive systems. All hypotheses are captured in a structured 
event tree. In a similar style to a formal accident investigation, 
a panel of experts was asked to assess the evidence and 
estimate the most likely causes for failure to adopt mission 
planning technology. Ten experts took part in this study; 
experts comprised adaptive systems scientists, AUV engineers, 
managers and technologists.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a 
review of adaptive mission planning systems, focusing on 
those used in oceanography. Section III presents the failure 
analysis process adopted to support this research. Section IV 
presents an analysis of the experts’ assessments. Section V 
presents the discussions and recommendations. Finally section 
VI presents our conclusions.  
II.  REVIEW OF MISSION ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Traditional robot decision making is based on three distinct 
processes: Sense, Plan, and Act (SPA). With the move towards 
enhanced decision making, perception, and intelligent 
capabilities, there has been an effort to extend and redesign the 
decision making architecture to facilitate development of these 
new robotic systems. At this stage, it is important to define 
what we mean by intelligence. There are many definitions of 
intelligence; the most widely accepted definition, and adopted 
in this publication, is that presented by Mystel et al. in [7]: 
‘Intelligence is the ability of a system to act appropriately in an 
uncertain environment, where an appropriate action is that 
which increases the probability of success, and success is the 
achievement of behavioural sub-goals that support the system’s 
ultimate goal.’  
Several authors have proposed different architectures for 
mission adaptive systems. Albus et al. [8] propose a model of 
an “intelligent machine system” that lays out a system with 
situational assessment feeding information on world models 
and value judgments that lead to behaviour generation. These 
are key concepts that are recurrent in many of the architectures 
and decision systems that have been proposed since. John 
Boyd [9], a military strategist, proposed a four level decision 
cycle [10]: Observe; Orient; Decide; Act. Referred to as the 
OODA cycle this has been applied across many applications in 
business, the military, robotics, and others. Patron et al. 
[11][12][13] apply this architecture to an autonomous mission 
plan recovery system designed to repair plans and create new 
plans depending on the situation. In this, application situational 
awareness encapsulates both the Observe and Orient 
components of Boyd’s cycle, while a planner using analytical 
tools makes the ’Decisions’ and a low level interface facilitates 
the ’Actions’. In a paper by Evans et al. [13] this four level 
decision making cycle was combined with the traditional SPA 
cycle and is re-implemented as: Reactive layer; Scenario layer;  
Sensor layer; Mode layer. 
In particular, these authors were looking at collision 
avoidance for autonomous robots and escape as a subsumption1 
approach where the reactive layer still provides a fast 
emergency response [14]. Dabe et al. [15] proposed a four level 
cycle consisting of: Perception; Situation Evaluation;  
Decision; Action.  
The difference between these different control loops is the 
decision making cycle. There is no argument about sensing and 
acting as critical stages in the process, the question remains, 
how does a robot decide what action to take given particular 
sensor data and user inputs? For this there are two distinct 
schools of thought. One framework follows a probabilistic 
approach, where feature tracking is achieved by having the 
machine learn hidden Markov model chains (HMM) from past 
AUV runs. A large number of scenarios are needed in order to 
train the HMM to make good estimates of the current 
environment state. When in a real mission the vehicle will act 
upon the most likely scenario, as estimated by the HMM. A 
second framework looks at the problem from an optimization 
perspective, where for a given set of observations the system 
reaches a decision that maximizes the utility function. Given 
that there are a number of possible behaviours this is often a 
multiple objective optimization problem – different approaches 
are proposed to solve this problem.  
There are several existing frameworks for adaptive mission 
systems that are currently being used and developed for AUVs 
and spacecrafts. Some well known frameworks are: MOOS-
IvP [16], TREX [17], ORCA [18], and ROS[19]. The 
predominantly implemented frameworks are T-REX and the 
MOOS-IvP. They will be reviewed here. A review of other 
frameworks is presented in [20]. 
T-REX (or the Teleo-Reactive EXecutive) was developed 
based on the temporal constraint-based planner EUROPA2 
developed at NASA [21][22]. T-REX is a modular control 
                                                           
1 Is a system coordination method where the architecture is built 
incrementally by adding layers in different phases. Each layer is composed of 
one or more Augmented Finite State Machines (AFSM), and depending on 
sensory information the layer can be active or not. When a layer is active, its 
output suppresses all outputs from the layers below taking the control of the 
vehicle. The layer can remain active for a period after the activation 
conditions finishes. It reduces the robot’s control architecture into a set of 
task-achievement behaviours or competences. Individual layers work on 
individual goals concurrently and asynchronously. Layers are organised 
hierarchically allowing higher layers to inhibit inputs or suppress outputs of 
lower layers. 
system with one ’Teleo-reactive agent’ or coordinator that is 
made up of many semi-independent Sense Plan Act (SPA) 
controllers, known as Teleo-Reactors. Each of these Teleo-
Reactors, or reactors, has a different functional and temporal 
scope. Functional scope for a reactor is a particular set of goals 
it understands, can plan action to achieve, and observe the state 
of actions to monitor goal success. Temporal scope here is the 
amount of time ahead for which a reactor makes a plan or 
deliberates, and latency is the amount of time it is allowed to 
take to make the plan. Each reactor has a ’timeline’ for each of 
the actions that are within its functional scope. These timelines 
are used to store the previous state of the action and plan the 
action state into the future. The reactors also have the facility to 
pass and receive goals for action upon, and observe the state 
recorded in the timeline of other reactors to access the state of 
their requested goals. There are four timelines:  
1. A Transect Timeline that takes locations and driving 
patterns. 
2. A Path Timeline that takes latitude, longitude and depth. 
3. A Command Timeline that understands commands for 
the vehicle control, (e.g. speed, rudder angle). 
4. A Position Timeline that reports the vehicle position. 
Each reactor has its own internal and external observing 
timelines that allow goals to be sent from one reactor to 
another.  
In a given deployment the “Mission Manager” reactor 
would receive goals from the user, such as science features to 
watch for, rendezvous points and mission timeouts. Its 
temporal scope would be the entire mission, and latency would 
be several minutes. This Mission reactor makes an initial plan 
for the entire mission where its actions are goals that are passed 
to the “Science Manager” and “Navigation Manager” reactors. 
An example goal for the Science Manager might be to identify 
thermoclines (dramatic vertical changes in water temperature), 
and for the “Navigation Manager” an initial waypoint request 
(go to latitude, longitude, depth). The Science Manager may 
then produce a plan to follow a path at a certain depth to check 
for a thermocline. It puts this plan as a request on “Transect” 
timeline that the “Mission Manager” has control over. These 
two middle level reactors might make plans for a minute ahead 
at a time, and would only need a second of latency to make 
these plans. Example actions that the Science reactor might 
produce, in response to a state read from the Vehicle Command 
Manager are requests for different paths between waypoints or 
diving patterns from the Navigation Manager or deployment of 
a special sensor from the Vehicle Command Manager.  
In [23] Rajan et al. present the results of two experiments 
using T-REX. Both were volume surveys. The first was an 
Intermediate Nepheloid Layers (INL) survey, and the purpose 
of the second survey was to track ocean fronts delineated by 
thermal gradients. The T-REX agent ran on a 367MHz EPX-
GX500 AMD Geode stack using Red Hat Linux within a 10Hz 
control loop, the functional layer ran on a separate processor 
using real-time QNX on the Dorado AUV. The scientific 
payload for this AUV was: two CTDs, a HobiLabs HS2 
HydroScat optical backscatter sensor and a Satlantic/MBARI 
ISUS Nitrate sensor. The experiments were carried out in 
depths up to 100m [23].  
The INL survey was carried out in November 2008 over the 
Monterey Canyon. The vehicle performed a 6 hour and a 40 
minute mission. The vehicle was fitted with ten water 
samplers, two water samplers were operated simultaneously 
enabling collection of 2 litre samples every two minutes. 
Results of this deployment show that the vehicle had changed 
its course in order to maximize the chances of capturing INL. 
The second deployment took place close to Monterey Bay. 
This involved a human-in-the-loop mixed initiative, where the 
scientist, in a location offshore, would indicate areas of 
interest. The vehicle navigated to these areas to locate the 
centroid of the front. Communication with the vehicle was via 
the Iridium satellite network.  
MOOS-IvP is a behaviour based mission management 
system within a software framework and toolset designed to 
resolve optimal action for an autonomous system with 
competing subsystem goals. The Mission Oriented Operating 
Suite (MOOS) is a software framework to facilitate modular 
development of software for autonomous systems. It is based 
around the construction of modular software processes that 
communicate using a publish/subscribe communications 
protocol, where modules can publish information from 
themselves and subscribe to publications made by other 
software modules via a central database. By creating publicly 
available middleware for modular software design, MOOS 
facilitates a community of shared work, rapid shared 
development of tools and infrastructure, and a common 
architecture for collaboration. 
MOOS-IvP is a software bundle that contains a snapshot of 
a MOOS open source release version with the IvP Helm, a 
MOOS process supported by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). The IvP Helm uses a behavioural-based 
architecture to organize its decision making. Each behaviour 
produces an IvP objective function that is used by the solver to 
make its decisions. It resolves competition between different 
behaviours by performing multiple objective optimization on 
their collective output using a mathematical programming 
model called interval programming (IvP).  
A MOOS-IvP mission consists of a set of user configurable 
behaviours, a state space model for activation and transition of 
behaviours. The modular nature of MOOS and the IvP Helm is 
based around the objective of code re-use in terms of code 
interoperability between vehicles and deployments and the 
benefits of code security with core code being used for 
substantial amounts of time in the field. Five benefits of code 
reuse are identified: diversity of contributors, lower cost, 
higher performance capability, higher performance reliability 
and reduced development time lines. This systems has been 
tested in several thousands of hours of simulation and several 
hundreds of hours of in-water experiments, on platforms such 
as the Bluefin 21in. AUV, the Hydroid REMUS-100 and the 
Remus 600, the Ocean Server Iver2 and the Ocean Explorer 
21-in. [14][16] [24]. 
Teleo-Reactive EXecutive is a software framework (T-
REX) that creates a single runtime environment for creating 
and executing plans. This means that plans are created, and 
recreated on a vehicle as it undertakes its mission, enabling re-
planning to adapt to environmental and vehicle realities. T-
REX is an instance of a Model-Based architecture, meaning 
that the knowledge about what is possible is held in a model. In 
the case of T-REX applied to an AUV this would mean the 
creation of a model of key parts and relationships for a given 
vehicle.  
MOOS-IvP is a behaviour based architecture. Both made 
up of middleware, infrastructure toolsets etc. and higher level 
autonomy capability. Both contain modules that are self 
contained controllers, MOOS-IvP describes as ’selfcontained 
mini expert systems’ TREX has teleoreactor SPA. Current 
adaptive AUV control work seems to have come back to this 
early question of reactive versus deliberative. 
III. FAILURE ANALYSIS 
There are a number of factors that can explain the reason 
why a new technology is not adopted by a given company or 
industry. The technology may not be as beneficial as originally 
thought or it may require unrealistic computer or human 
overhead. In this section we capture expert belief with regard 
to which factors may explain the lack of use of mission 
adaptive planning systems by the wider AUV community. The 
principle is similar to that followed for accident investigations. 
Once a timeline event has been established the next phase is to 
conduct a root-cause analysis. Scenarios representing different 
hypothesis are captured in an event tree, then experts are 
interviewed to assess the likelihood of a given scenario or 
hypothesis leading to the ‘accident’ [25] – which in this case is 
failure to adopt mission planning software. Experts’ 
assessments for all hypotheses were aggregated using an un-
weighted linear pool. However, for this study, we also intend to 
highlight the difference of opinions across the panel of experts. 
This is so that requirements critical to each party for 
technology adoption can be more effectively identified.  
In the following subsections we present the event tree 
derived to capture the main causes for failure to adopt mission 
planning software. Next the expert judgment elicitation process 
is described.  
A. Event tree of Failure to Adopt Mission Planning systems 
An event tree is a well known technique for modeling 
probabilistic problems, each event tree represents a unique 
probabilistic model. The tree is designed from left to right, 
starting from the End event – which is the failure for which one 
is looking to find the most likely root causes. The tree for 
failure to adopt adaptive mission planning systems is presented 
in Fig. 1. The End event, failure to adopt adaptive mission 
planning system is the node on the left hand side of the 
diagram. Chance nodes link the End event to other hypotheses. 
There is a likelihood associated with each hypothesis, which is 
obtained from expert assessment – this is discussed in more 
detail in the following sub-section. The tree was developed 
following a review of the literature and a discussion with 
adaptive mission planning researchers and engineers. We have 
identified the following causes for failure to adopt adaptive 
mission planning software:  
Failure to understand the technology. The engineers 
working in the AUV industry are trained software or electronic 
engineers. However the component of training in artificial 
intelligence is small, sometimes not more than one module in a 
bachelor’s degree. So it is possible that the technology is not 
adopted because the community of practitioners does not 
understand the technology.  
Failure due to the uncertainty with regards to resulting 
vehicle performance. The level of uncertainty is a key factor of 
any decision making process. It is impossible to test all 
combinations of a software algorithm. For example a small 
code containing 5 variables, each taking 100 states would 
require 1010 runs to test all possible combinations. If each run 
takes 1 second, the testing time would have to be over 316 
years. The computer science community has devised formal 
methods for software verification and statistical testing 
techniques to minimize the burden of software testing. 
Nevertheless this is not sufficient, confidence in new AUV 
technology is established by the successful number of sea 
trials. The lack of sea trials may be slowing the wider use of 
mission adaptive planning systems.  
Technology is too expensive. Cost is an important factor in 
any decision making process. Significant efforts are required to 
tailor mission adaptive systems to a type of vehicle. Key costs 
in this system are the development costs, which include 
computer overhead costs and the uncertainty associated with 
the development lifecycle. The computer science community is 
familiar with the Waterflow or V diagram for system 
development [26]. The spiral model proposed by Boehm et al. 
is also known in the computing community, which takes into 
account the prototyping phase [27]. However the development 
of knowledge based systems has its own development lifecycle 
[28]. How this lifecycle can be adopted by the industry may 
also be an obstacle stopping the adopting mission planning 
software.  
Benefits are not significant. Adaptive mission control has 
been used for accomplishing very particular tasks, such as to 
identifying a plume or other feature of interest. There is an 
argument that some of the rules adopted by the machine can be 
hardcoded onto the machine and thus similar performance can 
be achieved without the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
based techniques. The collision avoidance system for Autosub3 
is a clear example where a simple rule based system can 
perform the task that some would consider being a 
characteristic of an intelligent system. The Autosub3 collision 
avoidance navigated its way out of a cavity under an ice shelf 
in the Pine island glacier. The vehicle managed to navigate its 
way out after a major incident 55kms into the ice shelf using 
non-adaptive rule based techniques [29].  
Large uncertainty with regards to legal implications. A 
potential host of legal concerns related to AUVs irrespective of 
adaptive mission planning has been documented in [30]. More 
recently Kirkwood has set out a series of legal questions in 
response to a number of incidents that occurred with MBARI’s 
Dorado AUV [31]. As vehicles become more autonomous and 
able to perform longer missions it is possible that vehicles will 
cross water borders of different countries. The issue of liability  
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Fig.  1.  Event tree of expert judgments into the failure to adopt mission planning systems. Red circles represent chance nodes and blue triangles represent root 
causes.  
concerning a decision taken by an adaptive mission system 
may also be a deterrent for failure adopt this technology.  
Failure modes at level 1 can be decomposed into other 
subsidiary failure modes at level 2.  For example the 
Technology not understood event can be caused by two events: 
technology not well explained and technology is too complex.  
 
The first captures issues like how widely the information is 
disseminated. Many of the publications on the use of adaptive 
mission planning systems are found in robotics or AI journals 
and conference proceedings. This literature is not immediately 
accessible to engineers working in oceanography. Furthermore 
the language used in the literature may not be easy to 
understand for people outside the field of artificial intelligence. 
Thus the hypothesis technology not well understood is further 
expanded in two events: technology not disseminated wide 
enough and not explained appropriately.  
Other level 1 events that are expanded into level 2 and 3 
events are: uncertainty with regards to vehicle responses and 
technology is too expensive. The description of the level 2 and 
3 events follows in the same manner as was described for the 
level 1 hypothesis.  
A key benefit of using the event tree approach is that in 
addition to identifying the most likely explanation for a failure 
it helps identify what other events or hypotheses may explain 
the failure. This is useful information for reducing the risk of 
future scenarios.  
The event tree structure presented in this section was 
implemented in PrecisionTree5.7, a software tool 
commercially available to implement decision support models. 
A discussion of the expert judgment elicitation rationale for the 
likelihoods of each hypothesis is presented in the following 
subsection. 
 
B. Expert judgment Elicitation 
After the event tree has been described, the next step in the 
process is assessing the likelihood for each event. This task 
was carried out by a group of experts from four countries who 
have an interest in adaptive systems. Some experts have 
worked as researchers in the field others are experienced AUV 
engineers, others are senior managers who have in the past 
worked as engineers.  
Structured expert judgment refers to an attempt to subject 
the process of eliciting expert judgments to transparent 
methodological rules, with the goal of treating expert 
judgments as scientific data in a formal decision making 
process. The process by which experts come to agree is the 
scientific method itself. Structured expert judgment cannot pre-
empt this role and therefore it cannot have agreement as its 
goal [32]. Cooke [32] argues that a structured expert judgment 
elicitation process may aspire to three different goals: census; 
political consensus and rational consensus. In this study we aim 
to meet two of these goals. First we want to conduct a census 
capturing the general perception with regards to failure to 
adopt mission planning systems and second we want to present 
the results of a rational consensus with regards to the most 
likely root cause for the failure to adopt the technology.  
The following experts took part in this judgment elicitation 
process: 
Expert 1 is a professor in marine engineering, works for a 
government institution, has 14 years experience in AUVs. 
Expert 1 is based in Australia. 
Expert 2 is an experienced robotics engineer and manager 
with background in AI, works for a private company and has 
12 years experience in AUVs. Expert 2 is based in Canada. 
Expert 3 is a research engineer with a PhD from MIT in 
mission adaptive technology. Expert 3 has 12 years experience 
with AUVs and has participated in more than 10 AUV 
supported science campaigns. Expert 3 is based in United 
States. 
Expert 4 is a senior research engineer, works for a research 
laboratory where he is head of a research group responsible for 
the development of mission adaptive technology tailored to 
large AUVs. Expert 4 has 7 years experience in AUVs. Expert 
4 is based in United States. 
Expert 5 works for a research laboratory. Expert 5 has 3.5 
years experience in AUVs. Expert 5 has conducted many 
deployments and is leading the design of a new AUV for a 
Canadian University. 
Expert 6 works for a private company. Expert 6 is mainly a 
technologist. Expert 6 is a consultant in AUVs; he has worked 
on high profile AUV deployments, including the deployment 
of the ISE Explorer in the Arctic. Expert 6 has 6 years 
experience in AUVs. Expert 6 is based in New Zealand. 
Expert 7 works for a research laboratory; previously expert 
7 has worked as university lecturer. Expert 7 has 9 years 
experience with AUVs. Expert 7 is based in Scotland. 
Expert 8 works for a research laboratory. Expert 8 is a 
manager and has 5 years experience with AUVs. Expert 8 is 
based in United States. 
Expert 9 works for a private company. Expert 9 has 10 
years experience with AUVs. Expert 9 is based in United 
States. 
Expert 10 is a professor in marine geology, works for an 
academic institution. Expert 10 has 10 years experience with 
AUVs. Expert 10 is based in United States. 
 
An online survey was prepared and sent to all experts. The 
online survey consisted of questions asking the experts to 
quantify the likelihood of each hypothesis. The survey 
contained help instructions to clarify the question if required. 
Of the 10 experts 5 work for research laboratories, 2 for 
privately owned companies, 1 for a government institution and 
2 work for an university. The combined experience of the 
experts is 85 years giving an average of experience of 8.5 
years; the 75% quartile is 11.5 years. The role of the experts 
varied over the years. When asked to provide assessments of 
their current role one expert stated that he was an engineer, one 
was manager, one was a technologist. The seven remaining 
experts stated that they had mixed roles. Fig. 2 presents the 
assessments for all seven experts concerning their current role. 
Seven experts have managerial roles. The two experts with 
significant managerial roles also have a significant amount of 
their time devoted to engineering tasks (40 and 50% of their 
time). This shows that the experts that took part in this study 
are in a good position to understand the processes needed to 
adopt new technology.  
All experts were asked to quantify the likelihood of each 
hypothesis. Starting from the point where there is 100% 
confidence that failure to adopt adaptive mission system is 
explained by the five events listed in level 1, each expert was 
asked to spread the 100% confidence through the five 
hypotheses. The same process was followed to assess the 
likelihood of the events in level 2. Results of these assessments 
are presented in the next section of the paper.  
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Fig.  2.  Experts current roles in AUVs. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ASSESSMENTS 
Once all expert assessments have been provided, the next 
stage is to aggregate the expert judgments in a single 
assessment that represents the group view. However, as 
highlighted before the focus of this paper is also to provide a 
census of the general perception of why there has been a failure 
to adopt adaptive mission planning software. Therefore in 
addition to identifying the most likely causes for the failure to 
adopt adaptive mission planning software we will also discuss 
the variability in the assessments. The aggregated result of the 
assessments for each hypothesis is presented in blue in Fig.1. 
A. Level 1 failure events 
As shown in Fig.1, at Level 1, the most likely explanation 
for failure to adopt mission planning software is the 
uncertainty associated with vehicle behavior. The linear pool 
gives a 39.7% confidence that this is the main cause for failure 
to adopt adaptive mission planning software. Four of the 
experts (3, 8, 5 and 9) strongly agree with this view by 
providing their highest assessment to this hypothesis. Expert 3 
assigned 75% to this hypothesis, expert 8 60%, expert 9 60% 
and expert 5 assigned 40%. Expert 8 briefly summarizes that 
“… it is not perceived but sometimes actual failure to 
understand or be able to properly predict and modify behavior 
for vehicle response”. Expert 9 adds that “The asset value is 
too significant and the requirement for precise position 
prohibits true autonomy. Our use of AUV necessitates great 
confidence in position.” 
Expert 7 and 6 have a different view; both argue that costs 
and lack of clear benefit are the main causes for failure to adopt 
adaptive mission planning systems. Expert 7 states that within 
the community of marine scientists there is not sufficient pull 
to generate the demand for easily integrated solutions, in part 
because the marine science community would need to define 
the science goals for the autonomous actions. In his personal 
experience, steps towards developing autonomy with respect to 
science goals were relatively expensive with greater technical, 
rather than scientific, paybacks, thus scientists need to be 
drawn into this technical development. Expert 6 adds a similar 
argument, that from a commercial point of view, the value 
proposition may not be well defined and so the unknowns - 
which have to be solved using manpower and time - have an 
unknown value, thus cost surpasses value. The lack of 
understanding of the technology has a direct impact on the 
perceived costs. These two factors are the main causes for 
failure to adopt mission adaptive planning systems. Expert 2 
argues that the process by which the industry approaches new 
developments is inhibiting the integration of AI based 
technology. The general approach is that AUV builders sell 
existing technology and then wait for customers to ask for 
more functionality and fund it. This means there is a lack of 
funds for long term R&D in autonomy. “The perception is that 
customers don't need it or want it, but I'm not sure how valid 
that perception is based on what is conceptually possible.”  
This view is also supported by expert 4, who states that 
“The fundamental issue is that of poor understanding of what 
"autonomy" (esp. AI based) is, in the first place. Another major 
issue has to deal with the dearth of technical AI expertise in the 
ocean sciences/engineering. And funding agencies do not 
understand the implication of using AI methods towards such 
stochastic domains where uncertainty can be tackled 
effectively using such methods.” 
According to expert 1 failure to understand the technology 
is also a key factor. Expert 1 assigned 50% to uncertainty with 
regards to vehicle response and 50% to technology not 
understood. Expert 10 assigned 40% to both uncertainty with 
regards to vehicle response and technology too expensive.  
The second most likely explanations for failure to adopt 
mission planning systems are both lack of understanding and 
technology too expensive. This is general the view of all 
members of the expert group.  
Uncertainty with regards to legal implications is the least 
likely explanation for failure to adopt mission planning 
technology. The general view is that legal issues have always 
been a concern but it has never stopped the use of AUVs.  
B. Level 2 failure events 
Some of the events at Level 1 are further decomposed in 
sub events at level 2. This allows us to have more detail 
concerning the root cause for failure to adopt adaptive mission 
planning software. The likelihoods for failure modes at Level 2 
are presented in Table 1. At Level 2 ‘Insufficient demonstration 
trials’ is the main cause for failure to adopt adaptive mission 
planning software. Five experts strongly agree with this view, 
experts 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 assigned likelihoods between 75% and 
90% to this hypothesis. The idea that seeing is believing is 
something that resonates with these experts’ rationale. Expert 2 
commented that “people need to see something in action to 
really believe in it. Risk analysis is beneficial to ensure a 
mission will be as successful as possible, but it's not sufficient 
in its own right.” Expert 3 agrees with this view and highlights 
the difficulty in testing adaptive mission planning systems in 
real environments: “Testing is difficult and expensive, 
particularly if interested in a specific phenomenon that is not 
easily encountered, e.g. hydrothermal vent prospecting. Formal 
risk assessment is an interesting idea and perhaps applicable in 
some cases.” Table 1 presents the combined assessment for the 
likelihoods of causes at Level 2.  
TABLE I.  ROOT CAUSES AT LEVEL 2 
Failure mode Likelihood 
Insufficient demonstration trials 26.1% 
Lack of risk assessment 13.5% 
Technology not well explained 11.5% 
Development costs are not tangible 10.9% 
No predefined development lifecycle 10.6% 
Technology too complex 9.2% 
Total  81.8% 
 
Experts 1 and 10 argue that lack of risk assessment has a 
strong influence on the perceived uncertainty in the vehicle 
behavior but still rate the lack of trials as the most influential 
factor. Both experts assigned 60% likelihood that the perceived 
uncertainty with regards to the vehicle response was caused by 
insufficient demonstration trials. Experts 8 and 9 assigned 50% 
to both hypothesis, both rank the lack of demonstration trials as 
equally influential to the lack of risk assessment. This is a quite 
interesting assessment, particularly because the experts come 
from different industrial sectors. Expert 4 has a contrasting 
view to the rest of the experts prescribing the lack of risk 
assessment as the main explanation for the perceived 
uncertainty in vehicle behavior. 
As described in the previous section the technology is not 
well understood because either it is not well explained or 
because the technology is too complex. The assessments of this 
statement depend on the type of technique under consideration, 
as there are some non-complex adaptive mission planning 
techniques as stated by both experts 3 and 5. The experts were 
divided with regards to which of the two factors has more 
influence on the lack of understanding of the technology. 
Experts 1, 2, 5 and 9, believe that the technology is not 
explained appropriately. Expert 2 recognizes that the 
technology is complex but it could be explained better and thus 
assigned 60% to the likelihood of technology not being well 
explained and 40% to the likelihood of technology being too 
complex. Experts 1, 5 and 9 assigned likelihoods between 70% 
and 80% to the technology not well explained hypothesis. 
Experts 4, 6 and 8 believe that the complexity is the main cause 
for the lack of understanding. Expert 4, a leading scientist in 
adaptive mission planning, agrees that the level of explanation 
is often unsatisfactory. According to expert 4 this is caused by 
the size of the adaptive mission planning system. T-REX is 
implemented in more than 30,000 lines of code. It is a big 
challenge to explain the multiple facets, from Planning, to 
Execution to representation to inference. Experts 7, 3 and 10 
assigned 50% to both hypothesis. Expert 3 has had some 
success allowing real-time adaptive modification of missions 
with supervision. So expert 3 does not believe that the 
complexity is the main issue. Expert 7 is a strong believer that 
almost anything complex can be explained in understandable 
terms. Expert 10 agrees that the two hypotheses go hand in 
hand.  
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The lack of sufficient trials is by far the major factor 
stopping the adoption of adaptive mission planning software. 
Increasing the number of trial deployments is an obvious 
recommendation to mitigate this. Making the results of the trial 
deployments public and widely accessible is of equally great 
importance. One key point here is what makes a trial a 
successful test? Is it the identification of a given target or 
feature? is it the time taken to find the target? the number of 
attempts? These criteria need to be defined before the AUV 
community starts discussing validation of the technology. Once 
criteria have been defined then it becomes a question of 
identifying the number of successful tests to statistically 
quantify the confidence that given criteria is met. To address 
this, one or more groups with well established capability for 
adaptive mission planning could offer to run missions with 
objectives and criteria set by groups not having that capability, 
as wider demonstrators. Such a set of actions will increase the 
community confidence in the precision of adaptive mission 
planning systems.  
Adaptive mission sampling strategies are often highly tuned 
algorithms, to quote expert 10 “much like a tightly tuned PID 
controller and therefore work very well in the conditions and 
vehicles/settings for which they are initially developed but 
struggle in new settings- say differences in bottom type, 
morphology, vehicle make etc.” In our review we have 
identified that some frameworks require training for the 
knowledge based system to be effective. The process for doing 
the training needs to be transparent as does the method to 
measure its performance.  
Formal risk assessment has been identified as a key factor 
regardless of the level of autonomy [33][34][35]. When 
considering the adaptive nature of the mission then estimating 
the reliability of the system is key for the AUV risk assessment 
process. Well accepted methods for devising software tests for 
safety critical systems can be applied to estimate the reliability 
of adaptive mission systems [36].   
Identifying who is at fault for the lack of use of adaptive 
mission systems, whether it is the industry that has a lack of 
interest in investing in a technology that does not bring short 
term benefit or whether it is the researchers that have not 
explained the methods appropriately is not the aim of this 
paper. However, as identified by the panel, there is a general 
perception that the costs are too high and this may be due to a 
lack of understanding. A method to counter this is the 
combination of an increased effort to disseminate the results in 
oceanography journals and conferences, the frequent 
presentation of tutorials in conferences would be of great help.  
It is worth noting that adaptive mission planning has 
advanced much further in the unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and 
unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) environments than in UAV. 
This is largely because the vehicles are less expensive to build, 
there are no pressure hulls, exotic batteries and expensive 
sensors; and in addition the vehicles are much easier to find if 
they get lost. For an AUV, an Iridium modem just signals the 
vehicle position and other relevant info to the supervisor who 
may be thousands of miles away. The fact that physics prevents 
us from enjoying these same capabilities in AUVs explains 
why managers are unwilling to risk their multi million dollars 
machines for the sake of scientific research, particularly when 
they can accomplish their immediate objectives without doing 
so. 
Having recognized this problem now we in the AUV 
community need to fix it. Until we start doing something, we 
will not be on the path that leads to long term autonomy and 
the ability to implement increasingly complex missions in 
unstructured environments. The benefits of being able to do 
this are indeed very significant. For example, along with more 
efficient power sources, this capability is what will ultimately 
enable Long Duration AUVs and the truly autonomous work 
vehicle. So the industry needs to be paying a lot more attention 
to what university labs the world over are doing with toy-size 
robots, and look at how they can recreate the results in 
swimming pools, then in open-water under controlled 
conditions.  
Adaptive planning and control systems are not yet 
sufficiently mature for use in operational AUVs. Because of 
the substantial benefits that this technology can provide to 
subsea vehicle missions, AUV researchers, operators and 
managers need to place a higher priority on its development 
and introduction into open-water operations. 
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